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Abstract 
Marc Léger, John McLaughlin, and Cheryl Robertson, the three members of the New 
Brunswick Commission on Hydraulic Fracturing, spent months consulting various 
publics in New Brunswick. Their final report, released in early 2016, was not just about 
the controversial and divisive policy area. It spoke to a need for the province to engage 
with its citizens more transparently, more openly, and to understand why the paternalism 
and corporate and government elitism of the past is no longer viable. In this interview, 
their insights into how to address and engage with these publics are outlined, and the 
observations gleaned from direct interaction with groups suggest a way forward in future 
public consultations. 
Résumé 
Les trois membres de la Commission du Nouveau-Brunswick sur la fracturation 
hydraulique, Marc Léger, John McLaughlin et Cheryl Robertson, ont passé des mois à 
consulter différents publics néo-brunswickois. Leur rapport final, publié au début de 
2016, ne traitait pas uniquement de l’aspect controversé des politiques en tant que source 
de discordes. Ce rapport insistait sur la nécessité pour la province de dialoguer avec ses 
citoyens de façon plus transparente et ouverte, et de comprendre pourquoi le paternalisme 
et l’élitisme au sein des entreprises et du gouvernement du passé n’est plus viable. Dans 
cet entretien, on expose leurs points de vue quant à la façon de s’adresser à de tels publics 
et de les mobiliser. De plus, les observations qui proviennent de l’interaction directe avec 
les groupes offrent des pistes de solution en vue de consultations publiques futures. 
Introduction 
In February 2016, following the 2014 decision of Brian Gallant’s Liberal government to place a 
moratorium on hydraulic fracturing in the province, the New Brunswick Commission on Hydraulic 
Fracturing issued its report after nearly a year of discussions with every major stakeholder in the 
province. Mandated to report to Cabinet within one year from its March 2015 starting date, the 
commission’s findings came as a bit of a surprise to some for a government-mandated report. 
Refreshingly progressive in terms of addressing the issue of hydraulic fracturing, what the report states, 
both between the lines and directly, is that New Brunswickers, and Canadians for that matter, no longer 
tolerate backroom deals and government officials working non-transparently with the corporate sector 
on issues of immense public importance. 
While the commission was mandated to report on five specific conditions, its findings tell a far 
larger narrative about how New Brunswick has often operated with a paternalistic closed-door mentality 
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in which public discussion is not taken into account and where corporate and government stakeholders 
behave in unaccountable ways. Whether a stereotype of the province as the handmaiden of corporate 
forces or not, it is a narrative the public by and large believes. The commission tailored its findings to 
the mandate by Premier Gallant as to whether five conditions can be met to lift the moratorium: 
• a social licence in place; 
• clear and credible information about the impacts of hydraulic fracturing on our health, 
environment and water, allowing us to develop a country-leading regulatory regime with 
sufficient enforcement capabilities; 
• a plan that mitigates the impacts on our public infrastructure and that addresses issues such as 
wastewater disposal; 
• a process in place to respect our obligations under the duty to consult with First Nations; 
• a mechanism in place to ensure that benefits are maximized for New Brunswickers, including 
the development of a proper royalty structure. 
While adhering to these conditions, the findings in the report actually speak to the issue of 
engagement and credible consultation before any of the conditions can be met. That involves a 
series of changes in how government, energy or resource stakeholders, and citizen-organized groups 
engage with the publics. The report is not entirely damning of hydraulic fracturing nor is it a call for 
the wholesale end of resource extraction. But it does strongly suggest that the old ways of doing 
business in New Brunswick, especially with regard to land use and public space, cannot be done 
without proper consultation. 
The problem faced by the commission was that there was no blueprint for how a province 
conducts proper consultation and engagement to achieve social licence to proceed with policy change. 
But it is clear from the commission’s report that government needs to acknowledge that public 
attitudes and trust in institutions have shifted. In some respects, the commission’s report suggests a 
metamorphosis in terms of the idea of a Burkean trustee model of representation by elected officials. 
Publics no longer accept the idea of politicians acting for the greater good or in the provincial interest 
if these officials do not actively and transparently engage and consult with their publics. But they do 
not accept a delegate model of representation either. The public wants an element of direct 
engagement that will have a meaningful impact on public policy decisions. That is a different form of 
representation altogether. 
At the invitation of the editor of the Journal of New Brunswick Studies/Revue d’études sur le 
Nouveau-Brunswick, I sat down with Marc Léger, John McLaughlin, and Cheryl Robertson in June 2016 
for an exit interview and debriefing about their experiences as members of the New Brunswick 
Commission on Hydraulic Fracturing. Not only do the members speak to the concerns about how 
institutions have engaged the public, they also address why New Brunswick is behind other jurisdictions 
in shifting to a new paradigm that takes into account new and better ways of transparency and 
engagement with stakeholders and the public. This interview has been lightly edited and condensed from 
our discussion; however, syntax, colloquial expressions, and personal turns of phrase have been kept 
intact as per normal interviewing convention—and also to reflect the voices of the interviewees. 
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The interview is broken down into three broad sections. The first focuses on the public 
consultation and engagement process. The second considers the broad underlying theme of trust in 
institutions in the province. The final section focuses on the way forward in terms of public dialogue and 
engagement. The commission’s final report can be found at http://www2.gnb.ca/content/gnb/en/
departments/erd/energy/content/NBCHF_FinalReport.html. 
The Public Consultation and Engagement Process 
Jamie Gillies (JG): What was the mood and attitude of New Brunswickers to being consulted as part of 
a public engagement process, and how did the public take to these consultations? 
Marc Léger (ML): I would start by saying that what we had up to that point was a very traditional way 
of consulting on a divisive social and economic policy. It was as traditional as it gets. You had two sides 
that were polarized, they had their speaking points, and they were predictable. It was act, react, and go 
back and forth. It was the epitome of a traditional divisive debate where multiple sides were not 
listening to each other and were just sticking to their speaking points. That is where we started. It is 
important to understand our context. 
John McLaughlin (JM): From my perspective, the province had a series of failed conversations and 
really important ones, like post-secondary education and more specific ones on aging, so we came into 
this exercise with quite a lot of history in this province in terms of failing to engage. 
Cheryl Robertson (CR): From a personal point of view, before I was asked to serve as a commissioner, 
I would have considered myself a reasonably well-informed citizen and I did not have any bias on this 
subject. I do not think any of us did to look as we did at those five conditions. So what I brought to the 
table was a citizen’s awareness that this was an issue in the province, and it did seem divisive in terms of 
a lot of opinions and voices on each side. But there were people like me who did not seem to be giving 
voice to their questions and concerns, so I felt there was a need for a different approach. 
ML: Very early on we had to change the question and change the conversation because of how people 
viewed us and who those people were—those who came initially with an entrenched polarized view: 
frack or don’t frack. We established early on, in our first press release and on our website, that what we 
talked about is much bigger than fracking. It is about our energy future. What does this mean for climate 
change or energy policy? It was early on when we started testing those ideas. Our whole process was 
about testing ideas. Our blogs were about putting things out there and getting reactions that would 
further inform our discussions. Very early in the process, with our first workshop with Lisa Hrabluk of 
Wicked Ideas, we worked through the key questions and that is when, I think, we came out of this with 
an understanding that this was about a bigger way of thinking about things. 
CR: At that workshop with Lisa Hrabluk and Christine Comeau we were challenged to look at this 
process as an experience where we might start with a question, yet we were encouraged to keep our 
minds open because we were going to find the question would likely change as we went through the 
process. I did not grasp the full meaning of that at the beginning, but now, in hindsight, the question did 
change. And that is reflected in the report. 
JM: The commission almost failed to launch as there were some tense moments in the early days with 
the government getting agreement on what the commission was. Two big things occurred: one was what 
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we really meant by citizen engagement and how we were going to do it. I do not think there was 
opposition from government in those discussions, but I do not know if they knew or appreciated that the 
level of public trust was so low, not just in New Brunswick, but everywhere. The second one, which 
turned out to be a line in the sand, was that you could not just deal with fracking. Fracking has to have 
context. So we have to have a deeper understanding of how the province’s energy and environmental 
strategies evolved and how they come together and not answer these questions in isolation. That turned 
out to be a pretty tense conversation with government initially. 
ML: As we went into the senior echelons of the bureaucracy, they were puzzled we were thinking that 
way as well. They were not opposing us but there was concern. They were afraid of that uncertainty and 
of losing control. 
CR: I would emphasize that there was not any hands-on interference in our work from the government 
or public servants. 
JG: In the findings, you write that “while the Commission limited its research and its inquiries to shale 
gas, it quickly became clear that the root causes of the shale gas impasse are directly related to the 
process for identifying, evaluating and approving any resource development project.” So did you feel 
you had to change the questions when you realized what this was really about? 
ML: We were very disciplined to focus on our mandate and not to speak to all themes. In writing the 
report, we were confident, though, that people who really read it would see its use beyond shale gas. 
CR: When we were writing it, we felt like we should bold specific parts of paragraphs, to highlight the 
nuggets, so that the reader would not miss the essence of the message. 
JM: We were surprised at how many people were picking up that second level. 
JG: Did the public that participated in the process that gave you their ideas and feedback believe that 
their inputs would matter or did they believe that the engagement process was just window dressing, like 
the paternalism of the past? 
ML: Let me give you an example. Early on we met with two high profile groups and once we 
established that we were shifting from a traditional consultation to a dialogue, someone told us, “Either 
those guys are really good actors or they are really listening.” And once it got out that we were really 
listening, it evolved into changing the question and the dialogue we created. Some of the significant 
players in this debate left with the idea that we were listening and discussing and once you start 
exchanging ideas, you are moving away from a position that you are tied into to more of a dialogue. 
JM: I think from the beginning there were sort of multiple groups. Two basic things were that there was 
a deep skepticism. This one has to do with the province and had engendered its own narrative. It became 
a powerful story in its own right about mistrust on top of a long history. The second part is that the 
vested interests obviously saw this as one more crowd we have to sell our point of view to. They are 
tired, wayward people because they have been fighting the debate for a long time. They are going to 
tolerate us but they are skeptical. But they saw it as one more platform to get their message and plan in. 
And then behind all of that is the traditional. It is one of the reasons the province has not grown up. 
There are all these signs of social immaturity to the extent that there is a lateness in this province. 
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In the early days of the commission, the Telegraph-Journal was not supportive of the commission or its 
mandate, arguing that further studies were not required, the appropriate questions and answers were well 
understood and so forth, and it was now time to get on with creating jobs. But an interesting thing 
happened: they failed to take control of the conversation. 
CR: With most of the stakeholders we met, particularly the ones who asked to meet with us, the public 
servants, and all who had vested interest in ownership of this issue, there was a general skepticism at the 
beginning, so it was very important how we as commissioners presented. There was no chair; we 
rotated, and we decided early not to do town halls and instead conducted the process by inviting people 
and meeting with every group and individual who asked to meet with us. And we posted, with their 
permission, all of their submissions on our website so that their stories and views could be online for 
everybody to read. We were as transparent as we could be. But it was important to show that we were an 
autonomous, independent commission, separate from government, and a citizens’ panel, not an expert 
panel, and we were there to listen and learn, to seek out the findings related to those five conditions the 
premier had established. Everybody was respectful and very civilized; however, there were meetings 
where it took a while, especially in larger groups, to bring about that mutual respect. By the end of those 
same meetings, it was a different and more respectful, credible tone. And I think people, even though 
they might have been skeptical in trying to find trust in yet another commission, took solace in the fact 
that the premier had laid down a moratorium, and that gave everyone a little room to breathe and relay 
their thoughts respectfully. Some of the people were emotionally and physically exhausted after their 
previous efforts to have their voices heard and respected. 
Trust in Institutions in the Province of New Brunswick 
JG: You have discussed this shift in the commission from consultation to dialogue, and the deep 
skepticism of almost all of the publics you faced. I want to trouble this a little more, move away from 
fracking and toward the underlying points in your report. What do you think some of the roots are of 
those skepticisms, of the social immaturity, and of vested interests reluctant to consider a new approach 
to citizen engagement? 
CR: Some of the lack of trust was well earned by a succession of governments, and this lack of trust has 
also been well earned by industry and to some extent academia. We found low trust generally with 
public institutions and private corporations, and the origins of it are broken promises and actual lies told 
to them by governments, by government representatives, and by some corporations—and if that happens 
once or twice, some people get skeptical and I think that skepticism has been earned. Bringing back trust 
does not happen overnight. So one of the underlying goals for us was to lay the foundation for maybe 
rebuilding trust for governments and corporations that others could build on. We worked hard at that in 
our individual meetings with groups and to show leadership in this regard by “modelling the way.” 
JM: I do not want to discount the civility that we encountered. The image of fracking is cars being 
burned near Rexton, and in the context of populist rallies around the world you see a lot of nasty stuff 
these days. There is a reservoir of civility in this province—but do not associate that with trust. 
Somehow folks have retained a level of civility that I find deeply impressive even though they have lots 
of great reasons to be angry. That turned out to be very important. 
ML: We had many groups that came and with met us. They were all civil. But to really illustrate the 
point, we had a full day in Kent County. For the most part we met with people who were present when 
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cars were burned, people who were jailed, and people who still had injuries. Those people were deeply 
impacted by this. They had reason to not trust, or to be angry. We also had several days in the 
Penobsquis area where we met people pleased with the industry, and people with different perspectives. 
In those meetings, we always came out thinking how respectful people were in spite of their anger. 
Those were meetings with high emotion coming from the personal experiences people talked about. 
CR: At that first meeting in the Sussex area last summer, there were people invited by the corporation 
who was doing business there, and then later in December, we went back and met with citizens who 
might have different viewpoints. Those meetings were pretty impressive in terms of our achieving a 
better understanding of the depth of people’s pain and where their distrust comes from. It is important to 
note that we also made concerted efforts to meet with our Indigenous peoples as they are key players in 
all of this as rights holders, and we did our best to hear from them. 
JM: The civility side is very important. In terms of this culture of mistrust, it has taken us a long time to 
get to where we are and it is hard to identify the villains. But we have been in this period of transition 
for twenty years where the shared narrative does not make sense any more, the economy is not working, 
and social realities are getting quite troubling. It has taken us a long time to get to a level of awareness 
of what we are dealing with and there is unbelievable frustration in trying to break out of this mode. It 
does not help that there is no longer a shared public sense. On the one hand in Fredericton, there is an 
attitude that we are in the pockets of business and this lingering sense that we are not masters of our own 
destiny, and then on the other hand there is a stereotype that we have rural New Brunswickers living off 
of employment insurance and do not believe in creating wealth. And one of the reasons is that they are 
not talking to each other, and that there is no mass media in this province. There is something that 
pretends to be but it is not real. So the overall context is that for at least the last twenty years, we have 
not been talking to each other, and then there are a series of public institutions that have been in gradual 
decline and losing trust over time. Not overnight, but a thousand small things over time. It is 
government, it is the media, it is universities. We have had to import our experts because the local 
research community has not been stepping up. The idea of citizenship in the academic community is not 
very strong. So a lot of things have created this environment of arrested development. The world is 
changing, but we are unable to have an adult conversation. 
ML: If civility is a common thread, the other is a deep desire for information that people can trust and 
rely upon. This runs throughout the spectrum. Industry was not always getting what they needed from 
government. The public felt it could not get information from either industry or government. We kept 
getting examples from the public that the information they needed to make up their minds, credible non-
biased information, was unavailable. And that really came through when we met with citizens in groups. 
They want to be informed. 
CR: Not only do they want credible information, some of them emphasized to us that we should only 
put trust in peer-reviewed, top-notch research and information on the subject. Before I was a 
commissioner, the media pieces and many of the comments I heard about the vocal opponents to 
hydraulic fracturing left one with the impression that they were ignorant and misinformed and did not 
know what they were talking about. Once a commissioner, and when we met with these citizens, most 
with very scarce resources, my impression was quite different from the one promoted by the media. I 
was very impressed with the amount of time and energy most people put into finding their own 
information. Whether it was peer-reviewed, or top-notch scientific evidence, or not, they had 
information and seemed, for the most part, well informed. 
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ML: When we talk about the need for an independent regulator in the report, we touch on trust in 
government and government institutions. We need an independent body that can have real dialogue with 
citizens on the particular topic, and can provide unbiased information people can trust. 
JG: Let me trouble this notion of mistrust and finding credible information from government and 
industry. One of the narratives I observed in the initial debate as the Conservative government of David 
Alward was stepping up shale gas extraction as a policy option and subsequently as it became the most 
important issue in the last provincial election, was that those in favour of fracking more broadly saw the 
anti-fracking coalitions coalescing around ideas seen in a documentary like Gasland, which as a polemic 
does not present a complete picture. Alternatively, the government website on explanations of shale gas 
at the time literally presented information from Chesapeake Energy, a private American energy 
company, as fact and what the public information should be. So there seems to be a mistrust even among 
political and academic and government elites in using homegrown talent to actually solve problems or 
create new opportunities. So in terms of academics and experts not being utilized in the region, how do 
we then rectify that, because there are lots of experts in New Brunswick who perhaps understand more 
about fracturing than the consultants the government could call in? 
JM: Do not blame all of this on the external consultants. Everything about this is also about us. There is 
an arrested development and immaturity in this province and it is not just in terms of fracking but other 
policy files as well and about the future of the province. So there is a mistrust in trying to engage the 
public because each side sees engagement as unhelpful to its brand. On one hand, you have the 
boogeymen, supposedly the power brokers, and they are nervous about engaging in a public 
conversation. You have a political process that is very much caught up in a zero-sum game and the 
tribalism of politics. I think the politicians are now reacting to a period that has come and gone. So they 
do not want to put real issues on the table and there is a sociology there that is complicated. And then 
you have, on the other side, an environmental community that has not been listened to at all. They have 
been patronized but not really engaged in a consultation process for some time. What I find remarkable 
on that side is that you have some organizations that engage in protests as performance art, while 
mainstream environmental groups, like the Conservation Council of New Brunswick, do not. What 
impresses me is that despite the lack of effective engagement and despite being patronized, they have 
stayed in the conversation. They are actually one of my heroes in all of this. I think there are heroes on 
the industry side as well. Brunswick News may be a throwback to the old days, but JD Irving, in our 
interaction with them, were sophisticated, thoughtful, and while some of that may be performance as 
well, they backed it up with a lot of solid information. They were impressive. 
CR: In a stakeholder session with a number of senior executives of a large provincial corporation, I 
impulsively posed this question: “What is your view on social licence and how do you think that can be 
obtained?” as we learned there is an impression with some that SWN swaggered into New Brunswick 
with their cowboy boots and Stetsons and that people did not appreciate that. I guess I was surprised and 
disappointed that such seasoned and respected senior business leaders in our province would respond 
with the answer they did, an answer that, to me, indicated they would welcome anytime such a business 
into the province, no question, and that they seemed to me to woefully lack a clear understanding of both 
the importance of social licence and how to go about obtaining it. I left feeling quite disappointed and 
thought that here is one more piece of evidence that underscores the wide gulf of differing values and 
perspectives between some New Brunswick residents and some New Brunswick businesses. 
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JM: I have a different take. There was an important subtheme of the whole conversation from the 
industry side. This was a very powerful industry narrative that JDI helped to tease out that going into 
this exercise, and going back to the Alward Conservative government, they were presenting this as one 
of the panaceas for creating wealth for our export market and of course the whole natural gas economy 
was in the meantime collapsing and they were willfully ignoring all of that. But that was not what JDI 
was about. They were about a conversation on the domestic front about heavy industry and 
manufacturing, and this province had been moving off heavy oil and to natural gas and we had become 
very dependent on this sector. And their narrative was a very important part of this conversation. 
ML: When we spoke to people with a one-dimensional perspective, either frack or do not frack, we 
would say okay, we are going to use what you tell us, so let’s talk about the narrative you want to come 
out from your comments. That completely changed the dynamics. 
CR: This is where the question started to change! People thought about whether we should have this 
fossil fuel or not, then through the dialogue, they came to appreciate that we in New Brunswick already 
have a dependence on it, and we got a better understanding of how we are dependent already, so then the 
question became where are we going to get it. Not Do we need it. But Are we going to have our own 
supply or pipe it in from the U.S.? 
ML: Each of us has favourite parts to our report. For me, it is in Volume 2, pages 27–8, on 
royalties. What it says there is that if you put in the standard variables that can impact on royalties, 
you have an almost 50% variation on what natural gas would mean for New Brunswick. There are 
some complex problems that can be teased down to a single problem. But on shale gas, a lot of 
people were trying to narrow the debate down to a couple of speaking points. Fracking was a 
symptom of not having a full public debate on the issue in its entirety and all of its complexities, 
and the section on royalties illustrates that. 
CR: On the idea of arrested development, we do have a lot of expertise in New Brunswick; we were 
exposed to quite a bit of that and much of it resides in the public service. We have expert, competent, 
well-educated professionals working in our public service. My impression was that government does not 
use them as much as they could, and I would argue it should. I expect that in the public service perhaps, 
depending on the government of the day maybe, this lack of consultation must contribute to low morale. 
You have all this knowledge and no one asks to share it. There is a lot of expertise there. 
JG: How do we as a province break some of these habits or tendencies that all of you have touched on? 
How do we shift or break this stereotype of New Brunswick as a “company province” with a know-your-
place mistrust, albeit civil, and a feeling of gloom? You discuss corporate boardrooms that reinforce that 
stereotype, but then you talk about another side of this. How do you shift that as a province? 
JM: One is renewing our social capital. We have built a web of organizations and relationships from 
business councils, organizations like 21 Inc., to a variety of research institutions. Some of it is taking 
hold, some of it is just beginning, and we have a cadre of young people, just below the surface, who are 
up for shifting the narrative. It is slow and it is taking a long time, but building that infrastructure for 
social discourse and public engagement is good. We are in a transition in terms of public communication 
and public media. The traditional print media is fading away. We do not have a shared successor to that 
and we live in lots of echo chambers, but there are some very creative efforts underway right now to 
deal with that. Two is that we lead by example, and one of the reasons we wanted to talk about this is a 
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celebration of this discussion, and you build up confidence by having a few successes. Now this one can 
fail as well. But you have got to have examples of how to attack the public agenda. 
CR: I think education at all levels plays an extremely important role in helping to develop engaged 
citizens. I remember a time when New Brunswick was looked to in the 1990s as a leader in citizen 
engagement. Don Lenihan and others created documents and strategies and it felt good to be a New 
Brunswicker in the public service and to think that other provinces were looking to us as a leader. But 
we have trouble sustaining momentum, and I think government has a big role to play in this. As 
distrusted as they are, government has a major role to play and it is all about leadership at every level. 
Government needs to keep trying to engage with the public in meaningful ways, and after a while, it will 
take with some who want it and they will have a place at the table, eventually feeling listened to and 
respected even if what they want is not the final outcome. 
ML: I am going to be very granular in my answer and bring this back to the commission. We were 
open, we put our minutes out, we blogged, we got feedback. None of that is revolutionary, yet it was. 
People would come to us and say, “This is not normal. This is not how commissions operate.” And all 
it took was a website and public minutes and that started moving things a little bit. It was a different 
way of doing things. 
CR: And we know because we received feedback at the end of meetings when people would say that 
they felt listened to and engaged. 
ML: We told people, “Whatever you tell us, this is your opportunity to have your story for everyone to 
see.” So if you are used to being in closed boardrooms and saying confidential things, the dialogue 
changes when you know it is going to be out there for public consumption. I think it elevated the quality 
of the discussion. 
CR: What contributed kind of unexpectedly to a lack of trust again with government, and that got 
reflected on our commission, was the firing of Dr. Eilish Cleary. When that broke in the media, we were 
in a meeting with stakeholders, and one of the representatives said, “If this does not get fixed, even 
though this has nothing to do with you, this will reflect badly on you.” And sure enough, our secretariat 
got negative e-mails calling us contemptuous. 
ML: Our blog post on this is very good. 
CR: It would have been better for the commission for Dr. Cleary’s firing not to have happened in the 
middle of our work. The point is, though, that Dr. Cleary was widely trusted and respected in the 
province. For some, her dismissal provoked further suspicion, skepticism, cynicism, and lack of trust. 
JM: There were a few episodes like that, which could have discredited us. The Progressive 
Conservatives, for example, initially did not want to participate, and their initial strategy was to discredit 
the commission. Eventually they came around, and we had a good thoughtful session. But there are old 
playbooks and folks try to use them. Their playbooks are “this is just one more roadblock, and we’ll take 
this one down just like we have taken the other ones down.” 
ML: Some playbooks call for personal attacks, but there was a time when it was not as much about 
personal attacks. There are different ways to make your point. 
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JM: But they got no traction. We just did not respond to the editorials or the comments. 
JG: Vested interests exist in every jurisdiction, and public servants understand that they have to work 
with these groups and you cannot change everyone’s mind. Is that the case in New Brunswick as well? 
JM: There are three groups in New Brunswick. There are the technical experts, the mid-level publics 
servants, and we have very strong, capable, mid-level public service expertise—and we got all the 
help we asked for from them. Then you have the ecosystem around the regulatory environment, and 
every jurisdiction is concerned about being co-opted by whoever is being regulated. We are in the 
middle of the pack on that front. Where we really fall down is that we do not have any policy shops or 
a policy capacity. 
CR: In the context of moving forward, if I were in charge, I would work hard to wipe the slate clean and 
support an independent commission in any way possible. But you try to learn along with them. 
A Way Forward in Public Dialogue and Engagement 
JG: What about the role of the public service in terms of a policy capacity in future citizen engagement 
initiatives? How do you change and improve that? 
CR: It is about leadership at all levels and understanding not only the importance of citizen engagement 
but learning how to solicit and ensure it occurs. 
ML: The government of New Brunswick, like other jurisdictions, has eroded its policy capacity over the 
years. My experience with the commission is that we did not see a lot of innovative policy capacity on 
the file at hand or on the bigger questions we were posing. 
JM: We are in a period of deep change and there are huge structural changes coming; we simply do not 
have the internal capacity to confront these challenges. However, I would not be in favour of building 
this capacity just in-house. This has to be a network, and include relationships and different points of 
view. Building policy capacity strength in this province is one of those dimensions. 
JG: What about citizen focus on engagement in terms of rural and urban divides, or English and French 
and Indigenous divides, or northern and southern divides, or different age and gender publics? How did 
these publics feel about this process and did those divides play out? 
JM: The question is how do reasonably intelligent citizens come to grips with pretty deep technical issues—
and we were tested up front by these publics. We worked through that in terms of what we represented. 
CR: My sense was that there are different views in terms of rural and urban perspectives because most 
of this planned or hoped for shale gas exploration and seismic testing or test wells were occurring in 
rural areas. Urban municipal councils that support fracking were not supporting this in their backyard. 
They might not be so in favour of this occurring close to home. For example, at a meeting in Richibucto, 
a woman said to me, “I heard you say you were from Rothesay; how do you think this would go down in 
Rothesay?” She kind of answered her own question. So those people whose properties and lives are 
nearer to where shale gas extraction was likely to occur or had occurred had a different mindset and 
were more cautious in their approach and were more fearful. 
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ML: I am not sure I would divide it along French/English, urban/rural lines, but along risks and benefits 
lines. We tried to focus objectively on the risks and the benefits. And there are both. But some feel the 
risks disproportionately. If something is in the provincial interest, and the risks are at the local level, you 
need a dialogue on how those benefits are going to be shared with those who bear the risks. 
JM: In terms of the zero-sum game and tribalism in politics in New Brunswick, that is always there. 
And there were attempts to divide and conquer and even the promises for work and infrastructure from a 
shale gas industry that had little impact. Far more important for us were the beneficiaries in the broader 
community. If you are taking the risk that your property and way of life can be eliminated, I think that 
helped give this commission a different life. 
CR: In terms of Indigenous groups, we were presented with the concept of the cumulative effects of 
industry. These groups have a long-term idea and memory of what cumulative effects mean. It was not 
about well drilling and how it was done. It was about what else was in the region and on traditional 
land. They were looking at a broader picture because they are dependent on a day-to-day basis on the 
use of the land. 
JM: In Pennsylvania, there is a clear divide because private landowners own all of the rights. We asked 
about community infrastructure and legacies that these energy companies would leave behind, and there 
was no shared or communal legacy. So the economic and social geography of our province was a little 
bit different than other jurisdictions. 
JG: We need public engagement on aging, on natural resources, on the future of health-care delivery in 
this province, and on any number of issues. How does this province do public consultation in the future? 
Is the commission a model or a blueprint for how to do this? Are New Brunswickers ready for this and is 
the government prepared to go down this engagement process road each time we come to decisions to be 
made on complicated and divisive issues? 
JM: I think this was a step toward good engagement. We are not ready for the big conversations we 
need to have, but hopefully we are getting closer. But, look, we really need to do a lot better job on this. 
Regardless of the issue, they are all interrelated. We are long overdue for a major public conversation on 
the future of the province and a new sense of priorities. Are we ready for that today? No. Can we get to 
the point in the next few years? I think we can. Did this commission in some modest fashion contribute 
to figuring out how to do that? I hope so. 
CR: I think the idea of town hall meetings in 2012 with Louis LaPierre and the natural gas group were 
not as effective as hoped. We got so much negative feedback on that—from the public servants involved 
and the various groups that attended. Those town hall meetings were not productive. Sometimes it is 
easier to say what does not work. I am eager to read the outcome of St. Thomas University professor 
Kelly Bronson’s experiments about citizen engagement and shale gas. And Professor Tom Beckley’s 
research and experiments on engagement at UNB. This research is very interesting. What we are 
indirectly proposing in our report, among the subtle recommendations, is that this kind of engagement is 
very much needed and that governments should create a space for it—and, importantly, not be a 
cheerleader on one side or the other, but allow people to come to the table and participate in the learning 
and the debate. 
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JG: Based on these conversations and dialogues you have had, what do citizens of New Brunswick want 
in terms of engagement? And how do you get a provincial government to get to the point where this 
kind of engagement is what the government wants? Not window dressing citizen engagement. How do 
you get government, when they set up a citizen engagement commission, to accept the findings and go 
in expecting this is how it is going to be? 
JM: We are a little bit behind the curve but I think we are moving from a process where government’s 
only objective is to do pro forma consulting with the public, to something more legitimate where nobody 
owns the agenda. Government has distinctive knowable platforms for those kinds of conversations, but 
the narrative that is going to come out of all of this is going to be shaped by all of us. Deep change will 
be led by civil society and, in a small way, we were an example of this. This is perhaps not what the 
government wanted or expected. The conversation changed. 
CR: A lot of New Brunswickers felt and still do feel that we were mandated to give recommendations. 
That was not our mandate, but the perception was and is still out there. I am not even sure when this 
commission was struck (and we got only a one-page mandate) that it even mentioned citizen 
engagement. It was the commission that decided to seek information from the public to help us find 
the answers or information relevant to those five mandated conditions. They did not give us any 
direction on the how. 
ML: The press release said we had to consult, but no one told us how. 
JM: When we talk about how government has to change, the real change has to come from the 
community. So, for example, we are in this silly period today when governments talk about creating 
jobs, but we go through this charade (and the election promise of job creation) and they fail to do that so 
we get angry with them. The breaking out of that vicious cycle is not going to come from government. It 
is more likely to come from a more demanding electorate. Partly this will come from the evidence that 
they can make a difference and the process can change. So I think it is going to have to be the 
community pushing rather than government pulling. 
ML: I would not suggest that town halls do not have a role. We had the right approach for the questions 
at hand. For the deep societal questions we might have a useful model. But there are town halls 
happening as we speak and those may be the right forum for the right question. But I think the trap we 
fall into is that government and civil servants always recommend the traditional approach. It is one size 
fits all. Look at the budget consultations as an example. It has been the same formula for a long time: a 
minister goes to town halls across the province. The same groups come out, and then when it is all over 
they all pat themselves on the back. So how you get input, I think, has to be designed based on the issue, 
and there are different ways, as we have shown, to do a better job of getting input from the public. 
CR: A little success and positive reinforcement keeps you motivated. 
ML: When our report came out, industry and those against shale gas both saw things they wanted. In 
terms of people feeling they have been heard, it is not necessarily zero-sum or win-lose if they see some 
of their goals in the outcome. 
CR: We worked hard in writing the report so that people could see themselves in the report and feel that 
they were truly heard. 
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ML: An example is the section on community stories. It was important because that story had not been 
told, and it is part of the larger narrative on hydraulic fracturing. 
JG: To change gears slightly, what did you learn about what New Brunswickers think of their province? 
Did they say we are a paternalistic province, especially on large public policy issues? If so, which your 
earlier comments indicated, how do we balance that paternalism and how do we shift this to a 
comfortable balance? 
CR: We need more maternalism. 
JM: There is always paternalism, but New Brunswick does stand out, so it is more of a challenge here. 
It is real and it is complicated but that reality is slowly changing. There are social and economic forces 
at play that are marshalling us to a new place. The rural sociology of New Brunswick has defeated 
building an urban culture. We have the least urban community in Canada, and not only because we do 
not have “the city,” but because, even in our urban communities, social density is very low and that is 
becoming a huge issue as we move beyond a traditional resource-based economy. But to defeat that 
naturally over time is a huge challenge. Add in a demographic shift and different sets of values, in terms 
of aging, and these are huge challenges. Leadership may not come from within government here. If we 
want to expedite this process, we need some shared leadership. But even in terms of the commission’s 
exercise, there are traditional institutions, like Brunswick News, that reinforce the old culture—and 
those have been failing for some time and they are not resonating with the public. Our level of 
paternalism is high even by Atlantic Canadian standards. It is on its way down, and there are forces at 
play in which the traditional commodity-based economy day is coming to an end. There are social forces 
in which modernity has simply won. Can we focus these forces, get behind [them], marshal [them]? The 
answer is yes…but. St. Stephen provides an example of a citizen group trying to revitalize that 
community where leadership is not coming from government. It is new coalitions, and it is picking up 
on demographic waves. There is lots we can do. Another factor is that the social economic geography of 
the province is changing very quickly along a number of different dimensions. If we can channel these 
phenomena, we can tackle paternalism and other factors that were in our recent past. 
CR: What comes to mind is the last forestry agreement struck by the Alward Conservative government. 
In spite of the fact that people objected during the information stage of that process, in spite of the fact 
that academics with specialties in forestry and conservation spoke out against it, and even with 
politicians disagreeing, the outcome failed to meet the inclusivity threshold promised. If ever we saw 
government make a decision seem like there was something in it for everyone, we would jump leap 
years ahead in terms of trust and losing that paternalistic sense that we are being looked after by Big 
Brother in a company town and a company province. 
JM: That last forestry agreement provides an awfully good marker, because that will not happen again. 
And the role of the traditional print media in that exercise was received with significant skepticism. It 
really marked the end of an era. 
JG: This commission perhaps has come up with a good model for future public consultation in this 
province on important public policy issues. What jurisdictions outside of New Brunswick have been 
doing this well? Not that we can emulate perfectly, apples to apples, but are there other places that in 
your process through the commission you have noticed are doing this, and what would you recommend? 
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ML: We did not look at this as a commission exercise, so we don’t know. 
CR: When Nova Scotia released its report on this same topic in 2014, that panel was hopeful that the 
government and citizens would have the conversation about the future of this area. Instead, they put a 
moratorium in place. We are saying this too because it is time for people to come to the table and have 
the conversation. It is okay if we do not agree, but let’s come together and come to some reasonable 
conclusions about guidelines and monitoring. 
JM: We got a lot from Newfoundland in terms of technical expertise, and Newfoundland changed their 
direction based upon our example of public engagement. We learned from each other. If you look at 
their final report, they will acknowledge New Brunswick. Both of us went to Pennsylvania and we did 
not find very many examples down there that were credible in terms of public engagement. We were 
making a lot of this up on the fly, and some people started turning to us. 
ML: I think what is interesting is what could happen with our report. People who were not speaking to 
each other are now focusing on a really complicated topic—and are now saying that there is something 
in there that could help. There is now the opportunity to carry on the discussion with players who before 
our work did not think they had anything in common and saw each other as opponents. So because of 
the markets and the general natural gas supply and demand, the moratorium has been extended. But I 
think by changing the conversation and bringing people to the table, we presented an opportunity to 
carry on that deep conversation. 
CR: It has been six months, not a long time, but it is a long time in the life of a four-year government. I 
do not know of any initiatives that they are undertaking to address these issues apart from extending 
indefinitely the moratorium. Minister Donald Arsenault and Premier Gallant have not publicly addressed 
any follow-up, to my knowledge. One group that has done good things is Chief Justice Murray Sinclair 
and the [Indian Residential Schools] Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada. There is follow-
up to that significant work. 
JM: There was some social capital. We were able to further the conversation but so far no one has 
seized the opportunity. 
ML: But the example of how to do it is on the table. 
CR: Another thing we were told in the process of meeting with various stakeholders, especially around 
Kent County, Westmorland County, and parts of Albert County, was that Anglophones, Francophones, 
and Indigenous people came together and worked very well together. That is not going to go away, 
especially in the context of resource development. They will come together again, for good or for ill. 
ML: That will be the same pattern as before; it will be the people that should be at the table taking a 
traditional position versus a broader dialogue. The same groups could line up in the same camps and you 
would arrive at the same place. 
CR: But if there are spaces where people are allowed to exchange views, that process will improve 
the dialogue. 
JM: The whole traditional model of engagement, as a farmer told us in Kent County, does not make 
sense. That farmer’s ideas, this dialogue, is going to be part of the solution. 
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JG: As a debriefing or as an exit interview focusing on public engagement, is there anything we have 
not discussed that you would like to comment on? 
ML: Part of why we succeeded is that we led with independence and by stating that this was a bigger 
discussion than fracking. Despite what government spin-doctors may have wanted, we did it our way. 
That is natural of central government; they like to be in control. But they did allow us to take risks. I had 
an opportunity to debrief with individuals from the premier’s office, and one of my messages is that if 
you do this again, choose the people carefully and then let them go, let them do what they need to do. 
We did not know each other well when we started. We knew of each other. We started off with not 
knowing what process to follow. We decided that we needed to be open and transparent. When we went 
to Kent County, we took a risk there. They invited the media, it became a public show, it was very tense, 
and it could have gone either way. But it showed we were willing to take risks. When government 
decides to do these types of exercises, our experience shows that the commissioners have got to be 
allowed to run with it. 
CR: After the Kent County group discussions, we spent some time with the Regional Services 
Commission and I asked whether they had talked to people in Penobsquis about fracking. They said no, 
so at the last meeting with the Penobsquis people, I asked whether they were in discussions with Kent 
County. And one of them said that they had been in contact but the Kent County people have not lived 
the experience we have. They had seismic testing but not actual fracking. So my question to these 
groups probably should have been, As such a small province, why are we not talking to each other about 
our experiences rather than trying to look after everything by ourselves? We do not always reach out and 
learn from each other. 
ML: On these big questions, that reaching out is a must now. 
CR: Ultimately, it was a very rich experience to be a member of a citizens’ panel, and I learned a lot about 
my province and the people in it. I now have a much deeper understanding, especially of Indigenous 
concerns. What needs to be underscored is how respectful and civil everyone was even though they were 
passionate about their views, and I was impressed with the efforts they made with their scarce resources to 
find the information about what was relevant and to share that information. So I am hopeful we can learn 
from all of these individual experiences. As we talk about moving the conversation forward, we need to 
allow people to feel they have a voice even if what they want is not what happens in the end. 
JM: I did not want to serve on this commission initially. When I was called, I said no a few times. I am 
really glad I did this now. 
CR: I am really proud of this report. 
JG: Thank you all for your insights. 
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